$46.20K
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2
$46.20K
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2
Trader mode: Actionable analysis for identifying opportunities and edge
This market will resolve to “Yes” if a total internet blackout occurs in Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM UTC. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. For the purposes of this market, a “total internet blackout” occurring means that, according to Cloudflare Radar data for Iran, total bytes transferred have fallen to 1.0% or less of the last 4 weeks’ Max for at least six consecutive hourly data points, as shown in the Traffic trends → Bytes transferred (Total bytes) chart for the last 4
Traders on prediction markets currently believe a total internet blackout in Iran is almost certain to happen by the end of February. The market price translates to a near 100% probability, meaning participants see this outcome as virtually guaranteed. This forecast is based on the specific condition where national internet traffic drops to just 1% of normal levels for six consecutive hours, as measured by Cloudflare Radar.
The extreme confidence stems from Iran's history of state-imposed internet shutdowns during periods of civil unrest. The government has repeatedly used this tactic to suppress protests and control information flow, most notably during the 2019 fuel price protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. Authorities maintain extensive technical infrastructure for centralized control over internet service providers.
Recent regional tensions, including conflicts involving Iranian-backed groups and direct strikes between Iran and other states, create a backdrop where the government might again choose to sever digital connections. The market is essentially betting that another significant domestic crisis or external conflict will occur within the next month, triggering a now-standard authoritarian response. Traders are not predicting peace and stability.
The deadline for this specific prediction is February 28, 2026. Any major event before that date could be the catalyst. Watch for signs of large-scale public demonstrations inside Iran, which often follow economic shocks or political anniversaries. Also monitor any escalation in military clashes between Iran and Israel or the United States, as the government has previously restricted communications during security crises. Official announcements from Iranian telecom regulators about "network management" or "security measures" often precede wider blackouts.
Prediction markets have a mixed record on niche, high-stakes geopolitical events like this. They are good at aggregating available information, but they can be swayed by recent trauma and may overestimate the likelihood of dramatic, repeat events. The near-100% price suggests a very strong consensus, but it also leaves little room for unexpected stability. The biggest limitation is that the market is not predicting if a blackout will happen in a vacuum. It is predicting that some triggering event will occur within a narrow 30-day window, which is harder to forecast.
The Polymarket contract "Total Internet Blackout in Iran by February 28, 2026?" is trading at 100 cents, or 100%. This price indicates the market is assigning a near-certain probability that a total internet blackout, as defined by a collapse in traffic to 1% of normal levels for six consecutive hours, will occur in Iran within the next 30 days. This is an extreme level of confidence for any political event market, especially one with relatively thin liquidity of $46,000. The market's binary certainty suggests traders see the event as almost inevitable in the short term.
Two primary factors explain this pricing. First, Iran has a documented history of implementing nationwide internet shutdowns during periods of civil unrest. The government used this tactic extensively during the 2019 fuel protests and the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, establishing a clear precedent of severing digital connectivity to suppress dissent and control information flow. Second, current social and political tensions within Iran remain high. Ongoing economic strain and periodic waves of protest create a persistent environment where authorities are likely to deploy their established tool of internet blackouts. The market is pricing in the high likelihood of another triggering event before the end of February.
The 100% price leaves almost no room for error and could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. A key risk to this consensus is an unexpectedly stable period. If no major protests or civil disturbances occur before the February 28 deadline, the price would fall rapidly as the resolution window closes. Conversely, the price cannot go higher, meaning all market risk is to the downside. A definitive statement from Iranian officials foreswearing internet shutdowns, though unlikely, could also pressure the "Yes" price. The thin liquidity means a single large "No" bet could significantly move the price from its current peak, revealing the fragility of the apparent certainty.
AI-generated analysis based on market data. Not financial advice.
This prediction market focuses on whether Iran will experience a total internet blackout by a specified date. A blackout is defined as a severe, sustained drop in internet traffic, measured by Cloudflare Radar data. Specifically, total bytes transferred must fall to 1% or less of the previous four weeks' maximum for at least six consecutive hours. This technical definition aims to objectively measure a near-total shutdown of internet connectivity across the country. The topic is significant because internet access in Iran is a politically charged issue, frequently restricted during periods of social unrest or political tension. The government maintains extensive control over telecommunications infrastructure through state-owned entities and has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to impose nationwide or regional internet blackouts to suppress dissent and control information flow. Recent years have seen multiple instances of such shutdowns, particularly during major protests. People are interested in this market because it serves as a proxy for anticipating periods of significant political instability or government crackdowns within Iran. The likelihood of a blackout often correlates with upcoming anniversaries, elections, or spontaneous outbreaks of civil unrest. Monitoring this possibility involves analyzing both the technical capacity for a shutdown and the political climate that might trigger one.
Iran has a long history of internet censorship, but the strategy of imposing total blackouts is a more recent and severe escalation. A major precedent was set in November 2019, during nationwide protests over fuel price hikes. The government imposed a near-total internet shutdown that lasted approximately one week, from November 16 to 23. This event was one of the most severe and prolonged internet blackouts recorded in any country. NetBlocks, an internet monitoring group, estimated the economic cost of that week-long shutdown at over $300 million. The government justified the action as necessary to restore calm and prevent the coordination of violent protests. This established a clear playbook for the authorities. The tactic was deployed again, though with more variation in duration and geography, during the widespread Woman, Life, Freedom protests that began in September 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. During that period, internet access was severely restricted for weeks, with mobile data often completely cut in major cities during evening hours and social media platforms like Instagram and WhatsApp heavily throttled or blocked. These historical shutdowns demonstrate the regime's increasing reliance on this tool during crises.
A total internet blackout has severe and immediate consequences. Economically, it paralyzes digital commerce, disrupts banking and financial services, and halts business operations that rely on online connectivity. The 2019 blackout cost Iran's economy hundreds of millions of dollars in a matter of days. For citizens, it cuts off access to vital information, disrupts communication with family and friends, and impedes the work of journalists and human rights activists documenting events on the ground. It creates an information vacuum that the government can fill with its own narrative through state-controlled media. Politically, a blackout is a clear signal of the government's perception of a severe threat to its stability. It represents the ultimate tool of information control, preventing both the organization of protests and the global visibility of any crackdown. The social impact is profound, isolating communities, amplifying fear and uncertainty, and demonstrating the state's willingness to sever a fundamental utility to maintain power. The downstream consequences include pushing activists toward less secure communication methods, encouraging the use of VPNs and circumvention tools, and further damaging Iran's integration into the global digital economy.
As of late 2023 and into 2024, Iran's internet remains under tight control, with the National Information Network (NIN) expanding. While a nationwide total blackout is not currently active, the technical and legal framework for one remains fully in place. Authorities continue to throttle international bandwidth and block popular social media and messaging apps. The government frequently imposes localized slowdowns or disruptions, particularly around sensitive dates or in restive provinces. The threat of a full-scale blackout is considered a constant latent possibility, ready to be activated in response to any significant outbreak of protests or perceived national security threat. Monitoring groups like NetBlocks and Cloudflare Radar continue to track traffic levels for signs of coordinated disruption.
The Iranian government typically orders a blackout in response to major anti-government protests, large-scale civil unrest, or during sensitive political anniversaries. The primary goal is to suppress the organization of demonstrations and prevent images and videos of any crackdown from reaching the outside world.
During partial restrictions, many Iranians use Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to bypass blocks, though the government often throttles VPN traffic. During a total blackout, however, even VPNs are ineffective as the core infrastructure is shut down. Some may access limited services on the government's National Information Network if it remains operational.
The Supreme National Security Council, which includes the president, military commanders, and other top officials, has the ultimate authority to order a nationwide shutdown. The implementation is carried out by the Ministry of ICT and state-controlled internet service providers like the Telecommunication Company of Iran.
Cloudflare Radar measures internet traffic by analyzing data requests routed through its global network. A sustained, dramatic drop in traffic volume from Iran, falling to 1% of normal levels for multiple hours, is a strong technical indicator of a nationwide blackout, as defined for this prediction market.
The NIN is a domestic intranet system promoted by the Iranian government. It hosts approved domestic websites and services and is designed to remain operational even if Iran is disconnected from the global internet. Its expansion is a key part of the strategy to control online information.
Educational content is AI-generated and sourced from Wikipedia. It should not be considered financial advice.
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| Market | Platform | Price |
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| Poly | 100% |
| Poly | 100% |
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