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| Market | Platform | Price |
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![]() | Poly | 14% |
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This market will resolve to "Yes" if the United States conducts a major cyberattack against Iran between market creation and March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. For the purposes of this market, a qualifying “major cyberattack” is a cyber operation attributable to the United States that causes significant disruption, damage, or unauthorized access affecting core Iranian national systems—such as critical infrastructure, state institutions, the financial syste
Prediction markets currently give about a 1 in 7 chance that the United States will conduct a major cyberattack on Iran before March 31, 2026. This means traders collectively view such an operation as unlikely in the near term. The low probability suggests a broad expectation that current tensions, while serious, will not escalate to this specific form of direct digital conflict within this timeframe.
Several factors explain the low odds. First, recent public U.S. strategy has emphasized deterrence and diplomatic pressure over overt offensive cyber operations against state adversaries. Actions like imposing sanctions or indicting hackers are more common responses. Second, a major cyberattack carries significant risk of unpredictable escalation. Past incidents, like the Stuxnet worm attributed to the U.S. and Israel, were covert and deniable. A new, attributable attack that causes "significant disruption" to Iranian critical infrastructure would be a major public escalation, a step Washington has generally avoided. Third, the U.S. intelligence community often warns that Iran maintains capable cyber retaliation forces targeting American infrastructure. The potential for a damaging cycle of attacks makes this a high-stakes option.
The deadline itself, March 31, is the key date. Markets will react to any major incident in U.S.-Iran relations. Watch for reports of severe cyber incidents against U.S. targets that are publicly blamed on Iran. An attack causing physical damage or loss of life could pressure the administration to consider a proportional cyber response. Statements from U.S. officials explicitly threatening new consequences for Iranian cyber activity would also be a signal. Conversely, progress in indirect talks or a reduction in regional tensions would likely push the forecast probability even lower.
Prediction markets have a mixed record on niche geopolitical questions like specific military actions. They often effectively aggregate intelligence from news and expert commentary, but they can be swayed by rumors or short-term headlines. For this topic, the market is relatively small, which can make prices more volatile. Their main value is in showing the consensus view of informed participants right now, which is that a deliberate, attributable U.S. cyberattack on Iran is a low-probability, high-impact event.
The Polymarket contract "Will the US conduct a cyberattack on Iran by March 31?" is trading at 14¢, indicating a 14% probability. This price reflects a market consensus that a major, attributable US cyber operation against Iran within the next 37 days is unlikely. With only $79,000 in total volume, liquidity is thin, meaning the price could be more sensitive to new information than a heavily traded market.
Two primary factors suppress the probability. First, direct military escalation between the US and Iran has been historically avoided in favor of proxy conflict and calibrated deterrence. The US preference has been for sanctions and diplomatic pressure, with overt cyber actions reserved for extreme scenarios. Second, the definition requires a "major" attack causing "significant disruption" to core national systems like critical infrastructure. Past US cyber activity, such as the Stuxnet operation conducted with Israel, was covert and deniable. This market specifically requires an attributable action, which carries higher escalation risks the Biden administration has shown little appetite for, especially during an election season focused on domestic stability.
The 14% probability is not zero because specific triggers could force a shift in US policy. A major attack on US critical infrastructure or military assets that is definitively linked to Iranian state actors would increase the likelihood of a retaliatory cyber strike. An escalation in the shadow war between Israel and Iran that directly draws in US forces could also change the calculus. Monitoring for official US statements attributing significant cyber incidents to Iran, or a breakdown in indirect negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, provides the clearest signals for a shift in market odds. The thin market volume means any credible news on these fronts could move the price sharply.
AI-generated analysis based on market data. Not financial advice.
This prediction market addresses whether the United States will execute a major cyberattack against Iran before March 31, 2026. A qualifying attack is defined as a cyber operation attributed to the US that causes significant disruption or damage to core Iranian national systems, such as critical infrastructure, state institutions, or the financial system. The market reflects growing speculation about potential US cyber responses to ongoing regional tensions and Iranian activities, including its nuclear program and support for proxy groups. The topic sits at the intersection of international relations, cyber warfare doctrine, and escalating Middle East conflicts. Interest stems from the Biden administration's stated policy of using cyber capabilities as a tool of statecraft and the persistent shadow war between the US and Iran that has previously spilled into the digital domain. Analysts monitor diplomatic statements, military postures, and intelligence community assessments for signals of escalating cyber operations. The specific timeframe through March 2026 allows traders to weigh near-term geopolitical risks against historical patterns of US restraint in launching overt, destructive cyber campaigns against state adversaries.
US-Iran cyber hostilities have a documented history spanning over a decade. The most famous precedent is Operation Olympic Games, a joint US-Israeli campaign that used the Stuxnet worm to damage Iranian nuclear centrifuges at the Natanz facility between 2007 and 2010. This established a template for using cyber means to degrade physical infrastructure. In response, Iran has developed its own offensive cyber capabilities. Iranian hackers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been implicated in disruptive attacks, including the 2012-2013 campaign against US financial institutions and the 2013 breach of the Bowman Avenue Dam in New York. A more recent major incident was the 2020 attack on Israel's water system, attributed by US officials to Iran. The US has conducted cyber operations against Iran in more recent years, though often with limited disclosure. In 2019, US Cyber Command reportedly conducted a retaliatory cyber strike against an Iranian intelligence group after attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf. In 2022, the US reportedly disrupted an IRGC drone shipment to Russia via cyber means. This pattern shows a tit-for-tat dynamic where cyber tools are used for signaling and imposing costs below the threshold of armed conflict.
A major US cyberattack on Iran would represent a significant escalation in the long-running shadow war between the two nations. It could trigger immediate retaliation, potentially against US critical infrastructure, financial networks, or allied nations in the Middle East. Such an exchange risks miscalculation and spillover into conventional military conflict, particularly in the volatile Persian Gulf. For global markets, an attack could disrupt oil supplies and shipping lanes, leading to price volatility. The attack would also set a precedent for how major powers use cyber capabilities during periods of high tension. It could normalize destructive cyber operations against state-controlled infrastructure, potentially encouraging other nations to follow suit in future disputes. The legal and normative boundaries of cyber conflict are still being defined, and a high-profile US operation would influence international debates on these rules.
As of late 2024, US-Iran relations remain strained. Diplomatic efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) are stalled. Iran continues to enrich uranium to near-weapons-grade levels, and its proxy forces regularly clash with US allies in the region. The US maintains a substantial military presence in the Middle East. In the cyber domain, US officials continue to publicly attribute malicious activity to Iranian actors. In January 2024, the US and UK governments sanctioned individuals associated with Iranian cyber group 'MuddyWater' for attacks on critical infrastructure. No overt, destructive US cyberattack on Iranian national systems has been publicly acknowledged in 2024. The US policy appears focused on defensive operations, sanctions, and indictments, while reserving more forceful cyber options for contingencies.
Stuxnet was a sophisticated computer worm discovered in 2010 that physically damaged uranium centrifuges at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility. It is widely understood to have been developed jointly by the United States and Israel under a program called Operation Olympic Games, marking one of the first known uses of cyber warfare to sabotage industrial equipment.
The US government has not officially admitted to conducting the Stuxnet attack. However, subsequent reporting by major news organizations and memoirs by officials have confirmed US involvement. More recently, US officials have sometimes provided background briefings to journalists about cyber operations but rarely make on-the-record admissions.
Potential targets for a major cyberattack include Iran's oil and gas production facilities, its electrical grid, its financial payment systems, and networks controlling shipping at ports like Bandar Abbas. The Natanz and Fordow nuclear facilities are also high-value targets due to ongoing nonproliferation concerns.
Iran could retaliate with its own cyber operations against US or allied infrastructure, such as energy companies or water systems. It could also escalate through conventional means, like attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz using drones or missiles, or by directing its proxy militias to strike US personnel in the region.
US Cyber Command is a unified military command responsible for defending Department of Defense networks and conducting military cyber operations. It plans and executes offensive cyber missions when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Its capabilities include disabling networks, disrupting command systems, and conducting cyber espionage.
Educational content is AI-generated and sourced from Wikipedia. It should not be considered financial advice.

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